Dear NFL Team,
That guy you just took in the 2nd or 3rd round to be groomed into your “franchise quarterback,” (or your “quarterback of the future” if you prefer that term)…he is going to suck. Well, probably. I am holding out hope for Colt McCoy, but the past seems to tell a pretty consistent story of failure for teams drafting their signal caller in the 2nd tier of the draft.
I am not saying it is impossible for these guys to have success, but I just cannot understand why NFL teams continue to draft “2nd round talent” and assume it will develop. It works for virtually no one. Except the Steelers, sometimes (Kordell Stewart and Neil O’Donnell are the success stories and the word success is an awfully large stretch considering their service time).
The reality of 2nd and 3rd round picks is that they are often thought of as future franchise players (though sometimes they are legitimately meant to be backup quarterbacks). If the expectation is back-up, and you just really happen to like a guy, great. But if you think you are getting Joe Montana, you…aren’t. The back-up method (Whitehurst, Schaub) has yielded something in the trade market. However, when you draft with the expectation of getting a starter, the story generally seems to have one of three outcomes:
1) Your QB is truly awful and nary sees a football field. (Redman, Tuiasosopo, Greene, Beck, et al.)
2) Your QB is vaguely decent. Maybe kind of good, maybe pretty bad, but the tryout phase sets your team back, and you know a replacement is necessary at some point. (Q. Carter, T. Jackson, C. Frye, K. Clemens, et al.)
3) You drafted Drew Brees with the first pick of the second round. (Drew Brees)
Even the biggest success stories of the past 20 years (Brees and Favre) have seen their greatest successes on a different team than the one that drafted them. Brees moved on from San Diego and he won a Super Bowl. Atlanta accidentally took Favre as a funny, funny joke that nobody seemed to get (or at least that is my interpretation), and he looked bad for his rookie season before getting traded to Green Bay.
So, why do these early-mid round picks fail with such regularity? I imagine there are multiple factors:
TALENT
If you are a first round guy, you probably have a serious arm with serious accuracy. It turns out that is a prerequisite in the NFL.* Who knew? No rookie has all the tools, and all quarterbacks need to develop their bodies, their strength, and their understanding of the game. With second rounders, there is an additional absence of talent, and probably an absence in talent potential. While a big arm does not guarantee success, several missing pieces can hurt your shot at success, especially if they need to learn these skills on a time table.
*You don’t have to have a JaMarcus super cannon arm, and it is easy to forget negatives because of impressive arm strength. It is also, obviously, a mistake to overlook the whole player for one big positive.
LEARNING CURVE
A lot of these guys get 1 season on the bench at best. All the fans are excited, especially at this day in age with all the media and bells and whistles and whosey-whatsits, to see the brand new shiny quarterback! The talent lapse mentioned earlier makes learning all that more difficult.
SMALL SAMPLE SIZE TO PROVE WORTH
When this quarterback fails (see: talent, learning curve), he will do it in about a season (see: Clausen) or two (see: Brees) before the high draft pick is used on a 1st round successor. Of course, with some players, you can tell after that long. With Brees, they may have jumped the gun. The bottomline is that the 2nd-3rd round guy is SUPPOSED TO BE developmental in nature. So, when that guy doesn’t develop, you trash him? Why waste the pick in the first place. Let him learn, give him small chances to play, evaluate over a reasonable period of time…then trade your Matt Schaub, Charlie Whitehurst, or Kevin Kolb for a good return.
INVESTMENT
First rounder picks are a serious monetary investment. You pick a first round quarterback, the ties that bind are not easily shed for plenty of reasons. While they all play a role to some degree (image of franchise, expectations, talent ceiling, etc.), finances are a tangible measure for second and third chances of the first rounder. Unfortunately for the second/third round pick, they are not huge bonus babies, and the cutting process is much less painful for a franchise. The later pick gives the option similar to a lease rather than a purchase. And so often, the teams never purchase long-term.
To be honest, even when you follow these directions, there is a good chance that the talent part is too big, and he just was never meant to be a starter. Consider that fact. Now consider when expectations meet a lack of requisite talent, the results are predictably poor. That is what happens against overwhelming odds. The good news for late round picks is that the expectation is not there.
Somehow, teams don’t get this, and it is beyond me. It seemed like teams might have been on to it in 2010. Clausen fell. McCoy fell. Tebow didn’t. It still seemed like strides were made. However, 2011 came around, and I can hardly believe the results.
2011
2: Andy Dalton
2: Colin Kaepernick
3: Ryan Mallett
Mallett was taken with the strategy I outlined in mind. It is unlikely that he is Brady’s successor, and if he is, he will be plenty developed. Not to mention, his talent actual does indicate NFL levels. The Patriots selection is low risk, and exactly the type of pick you can turn into more picks later.
I want to like Dalton. I want to like Kaepernick. Not just as nice people, but as legitimate football prospects. But I don’t. To be honest, I don’t much trust Colt McCoy, either. I know, I know. He beat the Patriots! He had several very good games—but the end of the year stats aren’t very good, and the supporting cast isn’t taking big strides. My good lord, am I the only one who smells Charlie Frye all over again? These are bad situations made worse by mediocre talent levels. Same story, different chapter. This happens year after year after year. Chad Henne does not make the Dolphins a better team. He holds them back. The Kellen Clemens, Tarvaris Jackson, Brodie Croyle draft set all 3 teams back. Of the Kolb, Beck, Stanton, Edwards draft, the only one that holds value today is the one who wasn’t immediately played.
Side note: The drafting of Cam Newton was the best thing that could have happened to Jimmy Clausen, because now he gets to try to get his hands around the game from the bench. If he would have been sent out again and again, he would have been crushed. This gives him new life—probably not with the Panthers, but someone might show interest, and maybe only as a backup at first. But this is a blessing in disguise for him. Then again, because he was immediately a failure, there will probably never be a Kolb/Schaub appeal.
Talk is cheap. Talk is easy. And that is all I have done. Stats are the facts. Here are all the 2nd and 3rd round picks used on quarterback since 1990. I chose 1990 pretty arbitrarily, but it seemed like a large size for the modern area. If it seems too small a size, I would argue that the era of football demands a size like this. If you would argue that the size is too large, you may be right. But the argument made here only gets stronger as the era gets more modern.
I have included stats of only their original team—because, hey, that was their franchise team. They were supposed to be the QBOTF for THAT TEAM. The stats used are the number of games started, completion percentage, and TD/INT ratio. Those stats aren’t necessarily the full indicator of their contribution, nor do they stand head and shoulders above other methods of measurement. However, they give a general idea of what you are getting—and I do quite like games started in the context of a “franchise guy.” Games started, completion percentage, and TD/INT ratio are good starting places.
2010
2: Jimmy Clausen – 10 GS, 52.5%, 3 TD/9 INT
3: Colt McCoy – 8 GS, 60.8%, 6 TD/9 INT
2009
2: Pat White – 0 GS, --, --/--
2008
2: Brian Brohm – 0 GS, --, --/--
2: Chad Henne – 27 GS, 61.1%, 27 TD/33 INT
3: Kevin O’Connell – 0 GS, 66.7%, 0 TD/0 INT
2007
2: Kevin Kolb – 7 GS, 60.1%, 11 TD/14 INT
2: John Beck – 4 GS, 56.1%, 1 TD/3 INT
2: Drew Stanton – 4 GS, 55.6%, 5 TD/9 INT
3: Trent Edwards – 32 GS, 60.9%, 25 TD/27 INT
2006
2: Kellen Clemens – 9 GS, 51.8%, 5 TD/11 INT
2: Tarvaris Jackson – 20 GS, 58.7%, 24 TD/22 INT
3: Charlie Whitehurst – 0 GS, --, --/--
3: Brodie Croyle – 10 GS, 56.7%, 8 TD/9 INT
2005
3: Charlie Frye – 19 GS, 62.3%, 14 TD/23 TD
3: Andrew Walter – 9 GS, 52.3%, 3 TD/16 INT
3: David Greene – 0 GS, --, --/--
2004
3: Matt Schaub – 2 GS, 52.2%, 6 TD/6 INT
2003
3: Dave Ragone – 2 GS, 50.0%, 0 TD/1 INT
3: Chris Simms – 15 GS, 59.1%, 12 TD/17 INT
2002
3: Josh McCown – 23 GS, 57.8%, 25 TD/29 INT
2001
2: Drew Brees – 58 GS, 62.2%, 80 TD/53 INT
2: Quincy Carter – 31 GS, 56.2%, 29 TD/36 INT
2: Marques Tuiasosopo – 2 GS, 54.4%, 2 TD/7 INT
2000
3: Giovanni Carmazzi – 0 GS, --, --/--
3: Chris Redman – 6 GS, 53.5%, 7 TD/5 INT
1999
2: Shaun King – 22 GS, 56.3%, 26 TD/20 INT
3: Brock Huard – 4 GS, 55.8%, 4 TD/2 INT
1998
2: Charlie Batch – 46 GS, 56.0%, 49 TD/40 INT
3: Jonathan Quinn – 3 GS, 52.8%, 3 TD/4 INT
3: Brian Griese – 51 GS, 62.2%, 61 TD/43 INT
1997
2: Jake Plummer – 82 GS, 55.9%, 90 TD/114 INT
1996
2: Tony Banks – 43 GS, 54.2%, 36 TD/42 INT
3: Bobby Hoying – 13 GS, 53.5%, 11 TD/15 INT
1995
2: Todd Collins – 17 GS, 54.75, 16 TD/18 INT
2: Kordell Stewart - 80 GS, 56.5%, 70 TD/72 INT (note: 35 rush TD, 17 lost fumble)
3: Stoney Case – 1 GS, 52.6%, 0 TD/3 INT
3: Eric Zeier – 4 GS, 50.9%, 4 TD/9 INT
1994
none
1993
3: Billy Joe Hobert – 0 GS, --, --/--
1992
2: Matt Blundin – 0 GS, 25.0%, 0 TD/1 INT
2: Tony Sacca – 0 GS, 36.4%, 0 TD/2 INT
1991
2: Brett Favre – 253 GS, 61.4%, 442 TD/286 INT*
2: Browning Nagle – 13 GS, 49.0 comp %, 7 TD/17 INT
1990
3: Tommy Hodson – 6 GS, 54.3 comp %, 7 TD/11 INT
3: Peter Tom Willis – 3 GS, 56.8 comp %, 6 TD/15 INT
3: Neil O’Donnell – 61 GS, 57.1 comp %, 68 TD/39 INT
*Technically, Favre’s line with the Falcons was: 0 GS, 0.0%, 0 TD/2 INT. But that is a cheap shot argument, so we’ll pretend otherwise for now.
Hats off to all the vague success stories. Of course, with the exception of Favre, they were all replaced in a pretty timely fashion.
This doesn’t mean that lower draft picks can’t work out. In fact, the number of 6th round, 7th round, and UDFA quarterbacks having success indicates that it absolutely happens. However, it does mean that you should only use first round picks OR picks THAT LATE on a quarterback.
So, is the conclusion to never draft quarterbacks in rounds 2-3? Not necessarily, but if you are counting on that guy to be your future, you are making a massive gamble. Believing in yourself to “develop your guy” has been foolhardy again and again. The idea is draft in these rounds for backups who can either take over in the long-term or be traded. They are not solutions for the near future—and if they might be a solution, give them the best supporting cast imaginable. Then again, I would probably avoid that whole thing altogether, and draft from the first round. I give you all the Super Bowl quarterbacks (and their round of draft selection) since 1990:
2011: Rodgers (1) v. Rotherlisberger (1)
2010: Brees (2) v. P. Manning (1)
2009: Roethlisberger (1) v. Warner (U)
2008: E. Manning (1) v. Brady (6)
2007: P. Manning (1) v. Grossman (1)
2006: Roethlisberger (1) v. Hasselbeck (6)
2005: Brady (6) v. McNabb (1)
2004: Brady (6) v. Delhomme (U)
2003: B. Johnson (9) v. Gannon (4)
2002: Brady (6) v. Warner (U)
2001: Dilfer (1) v. Collins (1)
2000: Warner (U) v. McNair (1)
1999: Elway (1) v. Chandler (3) – colts
1998: Elway (1) v. Favre (2)
1997: Favre (2) v. Bledsoe (1)
1996: Aikman (1) v. O’Donnell (3)
1995: Young (*) v. Humphries (6) – *1st round supplemental of USFL
1994: Aikman (1) v. Kelly (1)
1993: Aikman (1) v. Kelly (1)
1992: Rypien (6) v. Kelly (1)
1991: Hostetler (3)/Simms (1) v. Kelly (1)
1990: Montana (3) v. Elway (1)
Per round
1: 24 (w/o Young)
2: 3
3: 4
4: 1
5: 0
6: 7
7+: 5
The second round picks:
-Brees, Favre, Favre
Third round (last appearance 1999):
-Chandler: drafted by Colts, there 2 seasons
-O’Donnell: 4 years with PIT, success, replaced following year by Jim Miller
-Hostetler: drafted to be backup for NYG, acted as that in SB win
-Montana: one of a kind
The lesson is that you are better of drafting from the 6th round than the middle rounds for success. Worst case (and likely) scenario is that your guy sucks. Now you only spent a 6th rounder.
